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RESPONSE TO THE LAW OF THE BODY BY
MEREDITH M. RENDER
E. Richard Gold∗
In her article, Professor Render does a great service by proposing to unify
legal rules relating to the human body through the concept of the “law of the
body.” She demonstrates that the law dealing with the body and its components
is often ad hoc in nature, sometimes contradictory and not necessarily in
alignment with how people generally understand and view the body. She
proposes that the law recognize that individuals hold an inalienable right to
their living, whole bodies,1 arguing that, with this starting point, we will be in a
position to develop consistent and fair legal rules over the uses of the human
body (e.g., surrogacy, using one’s skin as advertising, etc.) and its components
(e.g., cells, tissues, or organs removed from the body).2
It is uncertain to what extent Professor Render’s proposal to create a new
law of the body will actually respond to scientific and technological advances
in the life sciences. This should not trouble us for, as Professor Render
explains, her goal is more modest: “Clarifying the misapprehensions that have
arrested the application of property concepts to the body should clear the
intellectual path so that judges, lawmakers, and scholars can begin the work of
shaping a ‘law of the body’ . . . .”3 Thus, we should not worry at this point how
the creation of such a body of law will work itself out in practice. The goal is
simply to provide a solid foundation for future development.
Despite these positive aspects of her article, I put on my critic’s hat and
point to three areas in respect of which I would invite Professor Render to
either elaborate or simplify her argument. These should be taken as I intend: as
constructive criticism of an article that seeks to move into novel space.
Nevertheless, a critic must be critical and point to (seeming) contradictions,

∗ James McGill Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University. The author wishes to give thanks for the
support of PACEOmics, which is funded through Genome Canada, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research,
Alberta Health & Wellness, the University of Alberta School of Public Health and Faculty of Medicine &
Dentistry, McGill University, the National Institute for Health Research, the Association of Interprofessional
Healthcare Students, and Génome Québec.
1 See Meredith M. Render, The Law of the Body, 62 EMORY L.J. 549, 581 (2013).
2 Id. at 550–51, 554–55.
3 Id. at 604.
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loose thoughts, and, generally, weaknesses in the argument. I divide up my
comments as relating to the following: (a) the theoretical foundations of the
proposed property right, (b) the practical implications of the definition of the
subject matter of the right, and (c) Professor Render’s invocation of social
norms in support her argument.
A. Theoretical Foundations
In the process of arguing for the law of the body, Professor Render takes
the position that the “bundle of rights” theory of property is incorrect or, at
least, significantly incomplete. In doing so, she relies on the work of Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith in which they argue that the bundle of rights theory
ignores the in rem nature of property.4 They argue that property rights, unlike
other rights, are limited in the form those rights can take, invoking the civil law
notion of numerus clausus.5 This is not the place to question whether the
common law is actually as limiting as Merrill and Smith suggest. It is worth
noting, however, that Kent Schenkel points to an apparent flaw in Merrill and
Smith’s presentation of the argument: a trust actually permits the creation of
seemingly unlimited forms of control over goods despite technical limitations
on the form of title.6
Professor Render is, however, less concerned about the limited number of
forms that property can take—in fact, as discussed below, she suggests
introducing a new form of property—than the link that Merrill and Smith make
4 Id. at 562 (“Fortunately, the concept of in rem property rights has in recent years enjoyed something of
an intellectual renaissance. Merrill and Smith, in particular, have worked to provide a place for the concept of
in rem property rights within property theory writ large.” (footnote omitted)). She relies, in particular, on
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Numerus Clausus] and Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001) [hereinafter Law and
Economics].
5 Merrill and Smith were not the first to make this point. In their article, Numerus Clausus, they
acknowledge as such. Numerus Clausus, supra note 4, at 4. An almost contemporaneous study by Andrea
Fusaro makes a similar point about conceptual overlaps between the common law and civil law approaches to
limited forms of property. See Andrea Fusaro, The Numerus Clausus of Property Rights, in 1 MODERN
STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 309, 309 (Elizabeth Cooke ed., 2001).
6 See Kent D. Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. REV. 181,
196 (2009) (“The Achilles’ heel of the numerus clausus is that it is based solely on title and completely ignores
benefit. As long as title and benefit are separated, then benefit need not follow any predefined form, despite the
numerus clausus. And yet the value of property depends on the benefit it provides. Title, except to the extent it
coincides with benefit, has no value. Taking the benefit is taking the property even though title remains. And
in creating different or novel property interests our goal is to achieve a different kind of benefit, not a different
kind of title. This is why trusts can be used to achieve benefits not available under the common property forms.
The trust thus evades the numerus clausus and accomplishes our goals.” (footnotes omitted)).
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between the in rem nature of property rights and the fact that the subjects of
those rights are “things.”7 In doing so, however, she reads Merrill and Smith
too far, as she equates “thing” with tangibility.8 She recognizes that Merrill and
Smith apply their logic to intellectual property—an intangible object—but
departs from them on this point.9 In doing so, however, she not only moves
away from Merrill and Smith, but from the very in rem objection to the bundle
of rights theory upon which her argument is premised.
The in rem objection to the bundle of rights theory is that, unlike
contractual rights, for example, property rights extend to every person in the
jurisdiction without either his or her explicit consent or overt knowledge. That
is, the rights extend to anyone who comes into contact with the (tangible or
intangible) object of property, whether he or she is aware of the person or
persons holding property rights in respect of a good.10 It is the fragmentation of
rights (both in terms of holders and quality of the holders’ rights) that Merrill
and Smith argue is solved by accepting that property rights bundles are
standardized.11
The tangibility (or intangibility) of the subject of property is neither
dictated nor helpful for the in rem argument; all that is needed is to follow
Merrill and Smith in finding that predefined (and limited in number) bundles
of rights solve the epistemic problem of fragmented rights. In fact, the history
of the common law should make us eschew any connection with tangibility:
after all, the archetypical subject of property, the estate in land, is metaphysical

7 See Render, supra note 1, at 562 (“By arguing that ‘core’ property rights are in fact in rem rights, and
that in rem rights are qualitatively distinct from in personam rights, Merrill and Smith returned attention to the
tangibility, the ‘thingness’ of property rights—or at least, as argued here, some property rights—thereby
articulating the qualitative line between property rights and other species of entitlements.” (footnote omitted)).
8 Id.
9 Id. at n.60 (“Merrill and Smith actually extended their claims with respect to the in rem character of
property rights, and would have included intangible (yet ‘core’) property interests, such as intellectual property
interests, within their understanding of in rem rights. This Article, however, deals (for better or worse) only
with the concept of in rem rights in tangible objects of property, and the argument presented here departs in
this way from the full implications of Merrill and Smith’s position.” (citation omitted)).
10 Cf. Numerus Clausus, supra note 4, at 55 (“In rem rights provide protection against in personam
harms, but it is not practical to create an in rem right by bundling together myriad in personam rights that have
been individually negotiated with every potential wrongdoer.” (footnote omitted)).
11 Law and Economics, supra note 4, at 359 (“Because property rights create duties that attach to
‘everyone else,’ they provide a basis of security that permits people to develop resources and plan for the
future. By the same token, however, this feature of property imposes an informational burden on large
numbers of people, a burden that goes far beyond the need for nonparties to a contract to understand the rights
and duties of contractual partners. As a consequence, property is required to come in standardized packages
that the layperson can understand at low cost.”).
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and not the tangible land itself. The description put forward in the famous
sixteenth century Walsingham’s Case eloquently summarized the difference
between the tangible object—land—and the intangible subject matter of the
right—the estate: “[T]he land itself is one thing, and the estate in the land is
another thing, for an estate in the land is a time in the land, or land for a time,
and there are diversities of estates, which are no more than diversities of
time . . . .”12
Thus, the common law pays no particular attention to the tangibility of a
“thing” and offers it no different a status as far as the in rem argument is
concerned. Even the common law division between real property and personal
property is defined by the historically created set of remedies available for a
breach of a right rather than by the tangible or intangible nature of the subject
matter of the right.
Given the above, the statement that “[i]t is only to say that our legal
principles assume a special character—an in rem character—in the context of
the tangible”13 is not actually correct.14 Further, it is not necessary to Professor
Render’s argument as I argue next.
Significantly, Professor Render does not need an in rem concept of
property to achieve her goal of finding an inalienable right to control one’s
body. The bundle of rights theory allows for exactly this form of right and
could conceivably accord with it for exactly the set of reasons she gives in her
article: to protect an invaluable (perhaps most valuable to human life) good.
Whether it would actually do so involves a balancing of considerations, but it,
and not the more restrictive vision of limited sets of property forms suggested
by Merrill and Smith, is best positioned to achieve her goals.
Professor Render deploys the in rem concept of property in the following
way:

12

Walsingham’s Case, (1573) 75 Eng. Rep. 805, 816–17; 2 Plowd. 547, 555.
Render, supra note 1, at 567 n.92 (citation omitted).
14 Avihay Dorfman and Assaf Jacob, who are cited for the link between in rem rights and tangibility,
actually do not base their argument that copyright demands a weaker protection than tangible objects on any
special in rem character of tangible objects. See Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59, 96 (2011) (“More dramatically, these considerations demand, on pain of
glaring inconsistency, a substantially weaker protection for copyright. In pursuing this claim, we have shown
that the form of protection of property rights (including rights in tangibles) is, to an important extent, a feature
of certain normal, though contingent, facts about the human world.”).
13
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The living human body (and its constituent parts and products) fits
squarely within this in rem rights paradigm. As a resource, the human
body is finite and unique not only in that there are an exhaustible
number of living human bodies, but also in that living human bodies
are not fungible. My body is not an adequate substitute or
replacement for your body. Each living body serves a unique and
nontransferable function, and a person who is separated from her
body cannot be made whole with either money damages or a
replacement body. Of all the other core property interests, only real
property shares this attribute of uniqueness so completely, and real
property is the model upon which our in rem understanding of rights
15
is built.

In making this argument, she relies more on Dorfman and Jacob—who
argue that tangible objects have clearer boundaries that are easier to ascertain
than are intangibles16—than on any special in rem character of tangible goods
or on the numerus clausus principle.17 Professor Render’s central argument is
that for reasons of policy relating to the “unique” character of the living body,
courts ought to recognize a property right in respect of it. This concern over
policy is the bread and butter of the bundle of rights theory and is easily
accommodated by it.
B. Practical Implications
Beyond misgivings over the theoretical foundation of the argument, it is far
from clear that Professor Render could achieve her practical goal of using an in
rem theory of property to come up with an inalienable property right over the
whole, living human body. Such a property right would be an unlikely
candidate if, as Merrill and Smith contend, there is only a small set of possible
forms of property rights available. The common law does not normally
differentiate between whole, living and whole, dead bodies18 nor between the
body as a whole and its excised components (e.g., organs, tissues, or cells).19
15

Render, supra note 1, at 574.
See Dorfman & Jacob, supra note 14, at 86‒90. In doing so, they follow PETER DRAHOS, A
PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 158 (1996).
17 In fact, Dorfman and Jacob, supra note 14, at 96–97, rely on neither the in rem nor the numerus
clausus argument.
18 See, e.g., Render, supra note 1, at 580 (“[D]eath necessarily transforms the living human body into
another kind of entity: a corpse.”).
19 See, e.g., id. at 601 (“Because the right to transfer is not an incident of ownership in all contexts (and
in no context is it an absolute right), we can assume that existing rules regarding our ability to sell our body
parts will not necessarily give way to a radical shift in the degree to which our body is available for
commercial transfer.”).
16

GOLD GALLEYSFINAL

2016

7/7/2014 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

Vol. 63:2011

Further, the limitation that the right is inalienable runs counter to the general
common law value of alienability.20 In order to accommodate the proposed
right, the common law would essentially have to recognize a new standard
bundle of rights, one that seems doubtful on Merrill and Smith’s analysis.
This problem is exacerbated by the lack of sustained explanation as to why
the common law would choose to define the subject matter of the right as a
whole body rather than the physical body (dead or alive) or any bodily tissue,
whether in whole or in part. Because Professor Render puts aside any argument
based on the sanctity or special character of the human body,21 it is difficult to
understand why she limits the subject matter of the right as she does. Even if
the goal were simply to reduce informational uncertainty over who controls the
body, it is not clear why dead bodies are not included within the right for
which she argues. Further, while the identity of the holder of rights over the
components of the body—cells and tissues—may be less clear than for a whole
body, it is not a priori obvious why finding the holder of these components
would present any greater difficulty than determining the holders of excised
tissues and cells from other animals or from plants.
Beyond this, defining the subject of the property rights narrowly is unlikely
to help us answer many of the questions about which we care. Even were we to
agree with Professor Render that each person has an inalienable and exclusive
right to his or her body, this is unlikely to help us in determining whether
individuals can hold a property right in the components of their bodies (e.g.,
spleens, cells, and proteins) because, according to her, these are different
things than the whole, living body. While there is obviously a physical
relationship between a whole, living body and its components (at least while
housed within an intact body), that connection is broken once the organs,
tissues, or molecules are removed from the body. It is plausible to argue that
the same person who has a property right in the body has a right to that which
is extracted from it (in a way similar to rights a landholder obtains in the
minerals in the land), but it is equally plausible to argue the contrary (e.g., a

20 See, e.g., E. RICHARD GOLD, BODY PARTS: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN
BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 154–55 (1996) (discussing the neglect of nonmarket values in the construction and
allocation of property rights).
21 See Render, supra note 1, at 582 (“In other words, in this most literal sense, a human body is obviously
an object. That it is also more than a mere object is not disputed here. It is sensible that we should regard the
human body as a repository—if not, indeed, the sum—of our personhood, and therefore as a unique and even
sacred object in the world. But in addition to whatever metaphysical attributes the human body embodies, it is
also an entity in the world that is exceptionally useful and scarce.” (footnotes omitted)).
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legitimate invitee who finds an object sitting on someone else’s land has a
better right than the landowner).
Furthermore, while a property right over one’s living body may lead to
interesting legal debate over uses of the body, such as in surrogacy, it is
difficult to see how the recognition of such a right will change the nature of the
debate. The law already acknowledges an individual’s exclusive right to
control her body—subject to criminal and other laws—in a manner that leaves
little, if any, additional role for property law. It is not clear, for example, what
advantages one would obtain by adding a cause of action for conversion or
trespass to chattels to a claim of battery in respect of physical interference with
a body. It is unlikely that, in practice, one will actually see a case decided on
the basis of one’s right to one’s living body. If this analysis is correct, why
would the common law create such a right?
Most current debates concerning property rights in the body relate to rights
over excised body parts, such as spleens,22 tissue samples,23 or human genes.24
It is here, more than anywhere, that we most have the need for a law of the
body, but it is precisely here that Professor Render’s property suggestion offers
the least guidance. To be fair, one cannot expect her to lay out the
consequences of her approach for every property question that may arise; it is
enough that she sets a foundation. However, that foundation needs to be
closely enough related to the problems that will present themselves in court for
it to be relevant. Given that there will be few, if any, cases dealing with an
entire human body, there will be little opportunity to broaden the foundation of
law that Professor Render seeks to create so as to help answer questions about
excised body parts.
C. The Invocation of Social Norms
There is an interesting contradiction lying at the heart of the argument that
we ought to recognize an inalienable property right over whole, living human
bodies: that we ought to take social norms seriously when it comes to
recognizing a property right in the body, but we ought to ignore them when it
comes to understanding concerns about equating the body with property.

22

See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (in bank).
For example, see Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064,
1074–75 (S.D. Fla. 2003) and Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 994‒98. (E.D. Mo. 2006).
24 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2110‒11 (2013).
23

GOLD GALLEYSFINAL

2018

7/7/2014 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

Vol. 63:2011

Part I of Professor Render’s article states that one of the benefits of
recognizing a property right in a whole, living body is that doing so accords
with social norms: “So an understanding of the legal status of the human body
that acknowledges explicitly that we have a property interest in our own living
body would draw our legal conception of body-ownership closer in line with
our conventional conception of body-ownership.”25
Later, however, in discussing concerns over the incommensurability of the
human body with other goods, Professor Render puts aside any concern over
social norms. This is most evident in her discussion of the distinction between
“persons” and “bodies.” Here, she sharply distinguishes between the legal and
social concepts of property and asks us to ignore the social one:
However, in addressing this subject–object concern, as an initial
point it is important to be clear that our conventional concept of
“person” is distinct from our legal concept of “person.” When the law
defines what “counts” as a person, it is not applying our conventional
concept. Instead, the law is using the same word to refer to an
entirely different concept. Our conventional concept connotes an
ontological engagement with the category of personhood: what are
the necessary and sufficient conditions to “count” as a person and so
forth. The legal concept, in contrast, connotes an engagement with
26
what “counts” as a person in a given legal context.

Professor Render cannot have it both ways. If we take social norms
seriously—as I would suggest we ought—then we need to account for both the
phenomenon that individuals usually say they “own” their bodies with the view
that the body ought not be subject to property rights. Fortunately, there is a
way to reconcile the seeming contradiction. In the vernacular, “own” is not the
equivalent of “property right over,” but is a much more inclusive notion of
having the ability to exercise control over a good. In this context, “own” means
to “have power or mastery over” rather than to hold legal title.27

25 Render, supra note 1, at 578; see also id. at 577 (“Thus, to measure by our behaviors, we understand
our body to be an entity in the world—perhaps the only entity in the world—over which each of us is solely
vested with dominion. We speak and behave with confidence in our body-property, and we have structured our
social conventions to enforce these intuitions and thereby regulate relations with others with respect to our
body. In other words, both our social practices and our linguistic description of those practices suggest that our
conventional concept of “ownership” extends to the human body.” (footnotes omitted)).
26 Id. at 584.
27 Own, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/own (last visited Jan.
12, 2014) (defining “own” as “to have or to hold as property” or “to have power or mastery over”).
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With this understanding in mind, the point made in Part I of Professor
Render’s article, that individuals instinctively feel that they own their bodies,
does not translate, as argued, into a social norm recognizing property rights in
the human body. Similarly, it explains why those same individuals continue to
express concern over incommensurability in respect of the body. Rather than a
property right, the current state of the law, in which the law recognizes one’s
mastery over one’s body through intentional torts and constitutional law, better
reflects social norms. This may not be the end of the story as the courts or
legislatures may have good reason to override social norms. However, we
ought to be cautious in doing so, if for no other reason than that legislating
counter to social norms is usually ineffective.28
CONCLUSION
Overall, while Professor Render does us a service by taking the bold step of
arguing for a law of the body, there remain serious concerns over the particular
shape of the law she proposes. At a theoretical level, she locks herself
unnecessarily into a constrained version of property law that makes it difficult
to justify the particular form of the right she wishes to create. At a practical
level, the narrow nature of the right—over a whole, living body—limits the
effectiveness of the law of the body in answering fundamental questions at the
intersection of biology, technology, and the law. Finally, by not taking
seriously social norms related to the human body, her argument fails to fully
understand and address concerns over the incommensurability of the body with
other goods.

28

See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 117‒18, 131 (2000).

